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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of the present paper is to provide an overall analysis of recent studies that 
both focus on Africa and examine the various factors that attract or deter Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Africa, in order to find answers to the following question: What are the 
determinants / impediments of FDI to Africa? To that end I have based my research on the 
articles published in all the economic journals found in the Econlit database from January 
1969 up to May 2007. The keywords “foreign direct investment” and “Africa” yielded ten 
papers on FDI Determinants to Africa, which are the object of the present paper.
1
  
Although there is a dearth of recent research on FDI determinants to Africa (as suggested by 
several authors – e.g. Krugell, 2005; Asiedu, 2006), the empirical investigation on the issue is 
not confined to those ten papers. Therefore, we will provide further evidence on the factors 
that affect FDI to Africa, based on other references on Africa that I have found either from my 
own search on the issue or from the literature reviews of the studies published in academic 
journals indexed in Econlit and surveyed here.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a synopsis of the ten 
papers on FDI Determinants to Africa and is followed by Section 3 that presents the specific 
determinants of FDI for Africa, based on the studies surveyed here and other references on 
Africa.
2
 Section 4 contains some concluding comments and remarks. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The papers are: Morisset (2000), Schoeman et al. (2000), Asiedu (2002a), Bende-Nabende (2002), Lemi and 
Asefa (2003), Asiedu (2004), Yasin (2005), Asiedu (2006), Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006) and Fedderke and 
Romm (2006). Akinlo (2003) came out in our Econlit search using ‘foreign direct investment’ and ‘Africa’ as 
keywords, but this paper focuses on the FDI contribution to growth and was thus disregarded from the current 
analyis. 
2
 A table with a detailed description of each study is available upon request (smoreira@esce.ips.pt ). The table 
considers five major categories: author and year; countries and period; method of research; FDI determinants 
addressed and major findings. 
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2. Overview of articles published in Econlit on the determinants of FDI to Africa 
Morisset (2000) makes the point that African countries can also be successful in attracting 
FDI that is not based on natural resources or aimed at the local market, but rather at regional 
and global markets, by improving their business climate. Using FDI that does not arise from 
market size and the natural resources available in the host country as an indicator of the 
business climate for FDI, the author aims to first identify which sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
countries have been able to attract FDI by improving their business environment and then 
investigate which policy factors have played a significant role in the improvement of their 
investment climate.  
Evidence from the countries show that, in 1997, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and Mali 
were among countries with the most attractive investment environments, receiving more FDI 
inflows than countries that have a bigger local market (e.g. Keyna, Congo) and/or natural 
resources (e.g. Congo, Zimbabwe). Thus pro-active policies and re-oriented governments can 
generate FDI interest.  
To improve the climate for FDI, an econometric analysis for 29 SSA countries over the period 
1990-97 indicates that GDP growth rate and trade openness can be used to fuel the interest of 
foreign investors. A detailed review of the policy reforms implemented in Mali and 
Mozambique further indicates the following strategic actions for their recent success, beyond 
macroeconomic and political stability: opening the economy through a trade liberalization 
reform; launching an attractive privatization programme; modernizing mining and investment 
codes; adopting international agreements related to FDI; developing a few priority projects 
that have a multiplier effects on other investment projects; and mounting an image building 
effort with the participation of high political figures, including the President. 
Schoeman et al. (2000) analyse how government policy (mainly deficit and taxes) affects FDI 
through the estimation of a long-run co-integration equation for FDI in South Africa during 
the past 30 years. Of special importance are the deficit/GDP ratio, representing fiscal 
discipline, and the relative tax burden on prospective investors in South Africa.  
The main finding is that both fiscal policy variables have a negative effect on FDI flows to 
South Africa. According to the authors, there is room for the South African government to 
transform its economy into an investor-friendly environment, by adjusting fiscal policy. 
Serious attention should be paid to the tax burden which is still relatively high. 
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Asiedu (2002a) uses a comprehensive dataset of 71 developing countries, about half of which 
are in the poorest region of Africa – SSA – over the 1988-97 period to analyse whether the 
determinants of FDI to developing countries are equally relevant for SSA. The author focuses 
on three main variables – return on investment, infrastructure development and openness to 
trade – and the results imply that Africa is different.  
Higher marginal product of capital and better infrastructure do not drive FDI to SSA and, 
although openness to trade has a positive impact on FDI to SSA, the impact is lower than non-
SSA countries. Moreover, being an African country has a negative effect on FDI, mainly due 
to the perception that Africa is overly risky. The three policy implications are as follows: 
African countries need to liberalize their trade regimes and the reform must be perceived as 
credible by foreign investors; successful policies in other regions cannot be blindly replicated 
in Africa; African governments have to disseminate information about their countries to 
dispel the myth about the continent. 
Bende-Nabende (2002) aims to provide an empirical assessment on the macro locational 
determinants of FDI in SSA through the assessment of co-integration or rather long-run 
relationships between FDI and its determinants. The study comprises 19 SSA countries over 
the 1970-2000 period and employs both individual country data and panel data analyses 
techniques.  
The empirical evidence suggests that the most dominant long-run determinants of FDI in SSA 
are market growth, a less restrictive export-orientation strategy and the FDI policy 
liberalization. These are followed by real effective exchange rates and market size. Bottom on 
the list is the openness of the economy. Thus, as far as SSA is concerned, their long-run FDI 
positions can be improved by improving their macroeconomic management, liberalizing their 
FDI regimes and broadening their export bases. 
Lemi and Asefa (2003) address the relationship between economic and political uncertainty 
and FDI flows in African countries. The authors stress the following contributions of their 
paper: the first study in formally dealing with the role of political and economic uncertainty in 
affecting FDI in Africa using Generalized autoregressive heteroscedastic (GARCH) model to 
generate economic uncertainty indicators; the study analyze FDI from all source countries – 
overall US FDI, US manufacturing FDI and US non-manufacturing FDI – and their responses 
to uncertainty, whereas previous studies disregarded how the role of uncertainty differs by 
 4/20  
industrial groups and source countries; the period of analysis and sample countries are large 
enough for the result to be robust, which other studies did not consider. 
The results of the panel study for 29 African countries over the period 1987-99 are as follows: 
for FDI from all source countries, the impact of uncertainty is insignificant; for aggregate US 
FDI, economic and political uncertainties are not major concerns; for US manufacturing FDI, 
only political instability and government policy commitment are important factors; for US 
non-manufacturing FDI, economic uncertainties are the major impediments only when 
coupled with political instability and debt burden of host countries; other economic factors 
such as labour, trade connection, size of export sector, external debt, and market size are also 
significant in affecting FDI flows to African economies.
3
 
Drawing on the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI, Asiedu (2004) provides an 
explanation for the deterioration in SSA’s global (relative) FDI position. The author argues 
that SSA’s share of FDI to developing countries has declined over time, because of the less 
attractiveness of SSA for FDI over time, relative to other developing regions. The analysis 
focuses on three FDI determinants – openness to FDI, good infrastructure and institutional 
quality – using policy-related measures (since one of the objectives of this paper is to 
prescribe policies that will enhance SSA’s global FDI position) over the 1980-99 period.  
The main finding is that, with regard to FDI determinants, SSA’s experience can be 
characterised has absolute progress but relative decline. Indeed, from 1980-89 to 1990-99, 
SSA has reformed its institutions, improved its infrastructure and liberalised its FDI 
regulatory framework. However, compared with other developing regions, the degree of 
changes in SSA has been meagre. The policy implication that follows is the need to enhance 
SSA’s policy environment in both absolute and relative terms. 
Yasin (2005) explores the link between the two major sources of external capital needed to 
fill Africa’s significant resource gap (say, FDI and ODA), by using a panel data from 11 SSA 
countries for the period 1990-2003. The basic assumption is that Official Development 
Assistance (ODA, i.e. grants and loans from bilateral and multilateral organizations such as 
the World Bank) may remove some of the obstacles to FDI flows and thus improve the 
economic conditions that attract FDI.  
                                                 
3
 The US manufacturing sector includes food, chemical, metals, machinery and equipment, electronics and 
transportation industries, while the US non-manufacturing sector includes whole sale trade, banking, finance, 
insurance and other service industries. 
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In line with previous studies, there is a positive relationship between bilateral ODA and FDI, 
which suggests that ODA granting countries have a significant influence on the locational 
decisions of the multinational corporations (MNCs) located in these countries. Thus, African 
countries need to formulate policies to enhance the economic and political relationships with 
donor countries. As regards to multilateral ODA, the empirical findings on its influence on 
FDI flows are controversial to date. Yasin’s estimation suggests that these ODA flows are not 
a critical requirement for FDI activities by the MNCs in the developing countries. 
Asiedu (2006) utilises panel data for 22 SSA over the period 1984-2000 to investigate the 
influence of natural resources and market size vis-à-vis government policy, host country’s 
institutions and political instability in directing FDI flows to the region. The results suggest 
that countries in SSA that are endowed with natural resources or have large markets will 
attract more FDI. However, small countries and/or countries that lack natural resources in the 
region can also obtain FDI by improving their institutions and policy environment, because 
good infrastructure, an educated labour force, macroeconomic stability, openness to FDI, an 
efficient legal system, less corruption and political stability also promote FDI. 
In light of these findings, Asiedu stresses the importance of regional blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) in enhancing FDI flows to the region. In 
addition to expanding the size of the market, regionalism can promote political stability by 
restricting membership to countries with democratic political systems, as well as provide 
incentives for member countries to implement good policies through the threat of sanctions or 
the lost of access to the bloc for errant countries.  
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006) summarize the reasons for Africa’s poor FDI record, based on 
an overview of the empirical determinants of FDI to Africa. Their main aim is to identify 
concrete actions or strategies that need to be adopted at the national, regional and international 
level to enhance FDI flows to Africa.  
Briefly, these are the following: a) image building through an increase in political and 
macroeconomic stability, as well as in the protection of property rights and the rule of law; b) 
supporting existing investors through infrastructure development, provision of services and 
changes in the regulatory framework (e.g. relaxing laws on profit repatriation); c) marketing 
investment opportunities through the use of existing investors and information 
communication technologies instead of over-reliance on Investment Promotion Agencies 
(IPAs); d) diversification of the economy; e) trade liberalization; f) privatization; g) 
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enhancing regional integration; h) providing an external agency of restraint on domestic 
policies through the formation of regional groups; i) promoting good governance through 
regional surveillance mechanisms; j) initiating and encouraging infrastructure development 
projects at the regional level; k) improving market access at the international level through the 
elimination of trade barriers and subsidies on agricultural goods exported by African 
countries; l) investment promotion assistance by governments of developed countries through 
the provision of accurate information to investors in their countries; m) technical assistance 
by governments of developed countries in areas such as capacity building, health and 
education.    
Finally, Fedderke and Romm (2006) focus on the growth impact as well as the determinants 
of FDI in South Africa. As concerns to FDI determinants, they propose a model of locational 
choice of the investment activity between domestic and foreign alternatives and employ time-
series data for South Africa from 1962 to 1996 to test for the predictions of their model.  
In the context of the Johansen VECM specification, the factors that were found to either 
impede or induce FDI flows into South Africa are the following: labour capital ratio; market 
size; corporate taxation; wage costs; openness of the economy and the political institutional 
structure. The negative sign for labour capital ratio found from their estimations suggests that 
FDI in South Africa has tended to be capital intensive and thence the preponderance of 
horizontal over vertical FDI in South Africa. In addition, reducing political risk, ensuring 
property rights, bolstering growth in the market size, as well as wage moderation (ideally 
lowering real wages), lowering corporate tax rates, and ensuring full integration of the South 
African economy into the world economy follow as policy prescriptions from the empirical 
findings of this paper.  
3. Further analysis of the evidence on the factors that affect FDI to Africa 
According to Morisset (2000) and Asiedu (2006), the common perception among many 
observers is that FDI in African countries is largely driven by their natural resources and the 
size of their local markets. In an econometric study on 29 SSA countries for the period 1990-
97, Morisset (2000) found that both market size and natural resources availability have a 
positive influence on FDI inflows, with an elasticity of 0,91 and 0,92 using panel data and 1,4 
and 1,2 using cross-section data, respectively. Panel regressions presented in Asiedu (2006) 
for 22 SSA countries over the period 1984-2000 show that a standard deviation of one 
increase in the natural resource variable results in a 0,65 per cent increase in the ratio of FDI 
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to GDP and a standard deviation of one increase in the market size variable results in a 2,61 
per cent increase in FDI/GDP. 
Even though the African countries that have been able to attract most FDI have been those 
with natural and mineral resources as well as large domestic markets, these are not the sole 
determinants of FDI to the region. Morisset (2000), Asiedu (2006) and many other studies 
that focus on Africa suggest that the list of factors influencing FDI is fairly long, although not 
all determinants are equally important to every investor in every location at all times (Ajayi, 
2006). For Africa, then, the specific determinants of FDI include market size and growth, 
availability of natural resources, human capital costs and skills and availability of good 
infrastructure. Others are openness of the economy, political and economic stability, 
institutional quality, investment regulation and international treaties and guarantees. 
Investment promotion, return on investment and other factors such as cost-related factors, 
concentration of other investors, investment incentives, privatization and inflows of bilateral 
ODA are also FDI drivers taken into account (Table 2). 
Table 1 - Empirical Determinants of FDI to Africa: A synopsis of the literature  
FDI Determinants Econlit references on Africa Other references on Africa 
Market Size and Growth Morisset (2000); Asiedu (2002a, 
2006); Bende-Nabende (2002); 
Lemi and Asefa (2003); Yasin 
(2005); Dupasquier and Osakwe 
(2006); Fedderke and Romm 
(2006). 
Agodo (1978); Bhattacharya et 
al. (1996); Elbadawi and Mwega 
(1997); Bhinda et al. (1999); 
Basu and Srinivasan (2002); 
Asiedu (2003); Onyeiwu and 
Shrestha (2004). 
Availability of Natural 
Resources 
Morisset (2000); Asiedu (2006); 
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006).  
Basu and Srinivasan (2002); 
Kolstad and Tondel (2002);  
Asiedu (2003); Onyeiwu and 
Shrestha (2004). 
Costs and Skills of Human 
Capital 
Morisset (2000); Bende-
Nabende (2002); Lemi and 
Asefa (2003); Yasin (2005); 
Asiedu (2006); Fedderke and 
Romm (2006). 
Bhinda et al. (1999); Odenthal 
(2001). 
 
Quality and Quantity of 
Infrastructure 
Morisset (2000); Asiedu (2002a, 
2004, 2006); Lemi and Asefa 
(2003); Dupasquier and Osakwe 
(2006). 
Bhinda et al. (1999); Pigato 
(2001); Asiedu (2002b, 2003); 
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004). 
Openness of the Economy Morisset (2000); Asiedu 
(2002a); Bende-Nabende (2002); 
Lemi and Asefa (2003); Yasin 
(2005); Dupasquier and Osakwe 
(2006); Fedderke and Romm 
(2006). 
Bhattacharya et al. (1997); 
Asiedu (2002b); Onyeiwu and 
Shrestha (2004). 
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Economic and Political 
Uncertainty 
Morisset (2000); Schoeman et 
al. (2000); Asiedu (2002a, 
2006); Lemi and Asefa (2003); 
Yasin (2005); Dupasquier and 
Osakwe (2006); Fedderke and 
Romm (2006). 
Collier and Pattillo (1997, 2000); 
Sachs and Sievers (1998); Haque 
et al. (2000); Jaspersen et al. 
(2000); Kolstad and Tondel 
(2002); Asiedu (2003); Martin 
and Rose-Innes (2003); Rogoff 
and Reinhart (2003); Onyeiwu 
and Shrestha (2004). 
Institutional Quality Asiedu (2004, 2006); 
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006); 
Fedderke and Romm (2006). 
Emery et al. (2000); Te Velde 
(2001); Asiedu (2003). 
Investment Regulation Bende-Nabende (2002); Asiedu 
(2004, 2006); Dupasquier and 
Osakwe (2006). 
Basu and Srinivasan (2002); 
Asiedu (2003). 
International Treaties and 
Guarantees 
Morisset (2000); Lemi and 
Asefa (2003). 
-- 
Investment Promotion Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006). Morisset (2003). 
Return on Investment Schoeman et al. (2000); Asiedu 
(2002a). 
Jaspersen et al. (2000). 
Others (e.g. Other cost-related 
factors; Concentration of other 
investors; Investment Incentives; 
Privatization; ODA;…) 
Morisset (2000); Schoeman et 
al. (2000); Bende-Nabende 
(2002); Lemi and Asefa (2003); 
Yasin (2005); Fedderke and 
Romm (2006). 
Te Velde (2001); Martin and 
Rose-Innes (2003) 
Market size and growth have proved to be one of the most important determinants of FDI 
(Krugell, 2005). The most common argument for the relevance of market size and growth in 
attracting FDI goes like this: a large domestic market size generates scale economies, while a 
growing market improves the prospects of the market potential (e.g. Tsai, 1994). Thus, an 
economy with a large market size should attract more FDI and countries that have high and 
sustained growth rates should receive more FDI flows than volatile economies. 
Bende-Nabende (2002) found that market growth and market size are among the most 
dominant long-run determinants of FDI in SSA. Bhattacharya et al. (1996), Elbadawi and 
Mwega (1997), Morisset (2000) and Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) find evidence for the 
importance of economic growth in attracting FDI flows to Africa. After controlling for 
relevant country conditions, Elbadawi and Mwega (1997) also show that countries in the 
SADC region receive more FDI than other countries in Africa. Some investors, notably those 
from East Asian countries, have invested in Botswana in order to produce for the South 
African market (Bhinda et al., 1999). Multinational firms that wished to serve the large 
market in South Africa located their subsidiaries in Lesotho and Swaziland (Basu and and 
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Srinivasan, 2002). Asiedu (2003) and Lemi and Asefa (2003) also conclude that large markets 
(along with other factors) promote FDI to the region. The same goes for the South African 
country (Fedderke and Romm, 2006).  
In contrast, for US manufacturing FDI to Africa, Agodo (1978) found GDP and GDP per 
capita to be a positive influence, whilst GDP growth was insignificant. The hypothesis that 
higher growth rates foster FDI is also not significant in Asiedu (2002a) and Yasin (2005). The 
authors add that the attractiveness of the host country’s market is particularly important for 
market-seeking FDI, which is not likely to be the case as the countries included in their 
analysis are mostly poor and small countries.  
Historically, the availability of natural resources has been the critical factor in attracting FDI, 
because of the need of industrializing nations of Europe and North America to secure an 
economic and reliable source of minerals and primary products (Dunning, 1993). Though 
declining in relative importance, the availability of natural resources is still of particular 
importance for inward investment in resource-abundant countries, even though comparative 
advantage in natural resources by itself is no longer sufficient for FDI to take place 
(UNCTAD, 1998). 
The availability of natural resources has been found to be positively related to FDI flows to 
Africa (Asiedu, 2003; Onyeiwu and Shrestha, 2004). Kolstad and Tondel (2002) argue that 
countries rich in oil and other natural resources, such as Angola, are able to attract heavy FDI 
inflows. Indeed, it is in the mining of high-value minerals and petroleum where Africa is 
particularly prominent as a host to FDI and where great potential for future FDI exists (Basu 
and Srinivasan, 2002).   
Cheap labour and the quality of the labour force are other important determinants of FDI 
(Krugell, 2005). Lower labour cost reduces the cost of production; all other factors remaining 
unchanged (e.g. Schneider and Frey, 1985). However, rather than just low wages, it is 
important that wages reflect productivity (Krugell, 2005). It is generally believed that highly 
educated personnel are able to learn and adopt new technologies faster, and the cost of 
retraining is also less (Pigato, 2001). Thus, countries with a large supply of cheap but skilled 
human capital attract more FDI.  
Lemi and Asefa (2003) and Yasin (2005) find that the availability of an abundant and cheap 
labour force has the expected positive effects on FDI to Africa. While it may not be singled 
out as a sole factor, the success of Mauritius in attracting FDI is partly explained by the 
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relatively cheap, adaptable and well trained workforce (Odenthal, 2001). In the same vein, 
Fedderke and Romm (2006) show that wage costs impact negatively on FDI to South Africa. 
In addition, Lemi and Asefa (2003) and Asiedu (2006) also find evidence for the important 
role played by an educated labour force in attracting FDI flows to African countries. 
However, the lack of middle or senior level entrepreneurial experience has increased the 
existing skills gap in Africa, and many foreign companies have resorted to employment of 
expatriate managers (Bhinda et al., 1999).  
On the other hand, Bende-Nabende (2002) states that no definite conclusions can be drawn 
about mean years of education and real wages rates, because some countries in the SSA 
sample did not have sufficient time-series data for both variables. Morisset (2000) also found 
that the availability of relatively skilled labour do not appear to have been a major factor in 
the location decision of MNCs, advancing data shortcomings in most African countries as a 
possible cause. 
The availability of quality infrastructure is an important determinant of FDI (Krugell, 2005). 
A good quantity and quality of infrastructure, particularly roads, ports, water and power 
supply and telecommunications, by reducing transaction costs, facilitates business operations 
(Wheeler and Mody, 1992). Thus, infrastructure facilities are expected to have a positive 
impact on FDI inflows.  
Asiedu (2002b, 2003, 2006) provide evidence that good infrastructure promotes FDI to 
Africa. However, Pigato (2001) find that Africa lags behind in the number of telephone 
mainlines and the percentage of roads that are paved. The results from using fixed effects 
panel estimation in Asiedu (2002b) also indicate that the marginal benefit from increased 
infrastructure was less in the 1990s than in the 1980s and thus African countries need to 
provide better infrastructure in order to receive investments at levels comparable to the 1980s. 
Furthermore, Asiedu (2004) shows that, from 1980-89 to 1990-99, the rate of increase in the 
availability, reliability and development of infrastructure in the SSA region was less than the 
rate for all developing countries.  
In contrast, many studies find no evidence that infrastructure as measured by the number of 
telephones per 1,000 population has any impact on FDI inflows to Africa (Morisset, 2000; 
Asiedu, 2002a; Lemi and Asefa, 2003; Onyeiwu and Shrestha, 2004). Asiedu (2002a) 
suggests the following explanation: FDI to Africa tends to be natural resource-based and the 
availability of telephones is not relevant for natural resource-based FDI. Indeed, as stressed 
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by Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004), Angola and Nigeria are reputed to be the highest recipients 
of FDI in Africa in recent times and yet both countries have very poor infrastructure. 
In addition to physical infrastructure, availability and efficiency of financial infrastructure is 
crucial for attracting FDI. If countries have a weak financial market, instead of a well-
developed one, it is more difficult for investors to raise funds locally, although under certain 
circumstances, funds may be channelled from parents companies to their affiliates (Alfaro et 
al., 2003).   
A survey of several African countries by Bhinda et al. (1999) found that problems related to 
mobilizing local banking, leasing or equity finance were on the top of the list of factors 
discouraging investors in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In contrast, Asiedu (2002a) tested 
the robustness of her basic model using financial deepening (traditionally measured by the 
ratio of M2 to GDP) as a control variable, but the estimated coefficient rendered non-
significant.  
There are two opposing views linking openness of the economy to FDI flows. The “tariff-
hopping”/“tariff-jumping” hypothesis posits that high protective barriers stimulates direct 
investment in the host country as opposed to continuing to service it through exports, because 
of potential marketing cost savings and transport cost reductions (Krugell, 2005).  
On the other hand, the more open the economy, the more it would attract the FDI from MNCs 
seen as different affiliates specializing according to the locational advantages of the host 
country (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997). The importance of the latter is well documented in 
the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI to Africa (Bhattacharya et al., 1997; 
Morisset, 2000; Asiedu, 2002a, 2002b; Bende-Nabende, 2002; Lemi and Asefa, 2003; 
Onyeiwu and Shrestha, 2004; Yasin, 2005; Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006; Fedderke and 
Romm, 2006).  
Several studies have found that FDI in developing countries is affected negatively by 
economic and political instability (e.g. Lemi and Asefa, 2003). Political instability subsumes 
many kinds of events like antigovernment demonstrations, assassinations, cabinet changes, 
constitutional changes, coups, government crises, purges, revolutions, and riots (Moreira, 
2006). It is expected to decrease FDI because it increases uncertainty about the cost and 
profitability of investment (Krugell, 2005). In turn, instability in macroeconomic variables as 
evidenced by the high incidence of currency crashes, double digit inflation, and excessive 
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budget deficits is associated with macroeconomic policies that are not sustainable and thus 
makes investment unattractive (Krugell, 2005).    
In a survey of foreign owned firms in Africa, Sachs and Sievers (1998) find that the greatest 
concern of firm owners is stability, both political and macroeconomic. In an empirical 
analysis of the social and political development of foreign investment in Africa, Kolstad and 
Tondel (2002) find that countries that are less risky attract more FDI per capita. Asiedu (2003, 
2006) also shows that both macroeconomic and political instability deter investment flows in 
Africa. In addition, Rogoff and Reinhart (2003) obtain a statistically significant negative 
correlation between FDI and the following indicators of political and economic instability in 
Africa: conflicts; inflation; probability that the parallel market premia is above 50 percent.  
Furthermore, a closer look at the improvements in the business climate of Mali and 
Mozambique during the 1990s also reveals that macroeconomic and political stability was 
among the reasons for their recent success (Morisset, 2000). 
As stated in the previous section, the study by Lemi and Asefa (2003) examines how 
uncertainty affects FDI flows to African countries. In general, the results differ by industrial 
group and source country. For FDI flows from all source countries and for US FDI flows, 
Lemi and Asefa (2003) show that both political and economic uncertainties are not significant 
determinants. The same result was reached in Asiedu (2002a).  
In relation to political uncertainty per si, Morisset (2000), Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) and 
Yasin (2005) find that political instability is not a significant determinant of FDI flows in 
Africa. On the other hand, Fedderke and Romm (2006) find that political stability has a 
positive impact on FDI to South Africa. The results for US manufacturing FDI to Africa also 
indicate that political instability is a concern to foreign investors (Lemi and Asefa, 2003).  
As concerns to economic uncertainty per si, Lemi and Asefa (2003) find that it is binding for 
US non-manufacturing FDI to Africa only when economic uncertainty is coupled with 
political instability and debt burden of host countries. Schoeman et al. (2000) focus on fiscal 
stability as it is generally considered to be one of the indicators of macroeconomic stability. 
The results suggest that the higher the budget deficit relative to South African GDP the 
greater the negative impact on FDI relative to South African GDP. Finally, based on panel 
data for 29 African countries over the period 1975 to 1999, Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) 
provide evidence that countries with high inflation tend to attract less FDI. 
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Unfortunately, the image of the African continent as a location of FDI is unfavourable, 
because investors perceive the continent as a home for wars, civil unrest, poverty, disease and 
a generally unfriendly investment destination and this result in the diversion of these 
investments to other regions (UNCTAD, 1999) In other words, African countries receive less 
FDI than countries in other regions, by virtue of the (perceived) riskiness of the continent.  
Asiedu (2002a) and Jaspersen et al. (2000) argue that being an African country is indeed a 
significantly negative determinant of FDI, because of investors’ perceptions of Africa as 
inherently risky. According to the findings of Haque et al. (2000) and Collier and Pattillo 
(1997, 2000), commercial risk rating agencies rate African countries as riskier than justified 
by their fundamental investment conditions. On the other hand, a study on private capital 
flows to low-income countries by Martin and Rose-Innes (2003) reveals that investors no 
longer fully share the continuing negative perception of much of Africa as a “basket case” 
region with high risk and low return, which determines the attitudes of many MNC 
headquarters, the international media and some agencies. In a study of regional susceptibility 
to war, Rogoff and Reinhart (2003) found that wars are more likely to occur in Africa than in 
other regions and there is a negative correlation between FDI and conflict in Africa.  
There is empirical evidence today that inefficient institutions as measured by corruption and 
weak enforcement of contracts deter FDI (e.g. Gastagana et al., 1998). According to the 
institutional quality variable of Knack and Keefer (1995), for instance, the quality of 
institutions is captured based on the simple average of the ratings provided by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the following five institutional indicators: rule 
of law; expropriation risk; repudiation of contracts by government; corruption in government; 
and quality of the bureaucracy. A country where it takes excessive time and costs to 
accomplish all procedures necessary to establish and operate will see its potential investors 
lose money and decide to locate elsewhere or cancel their investment projects (Morisset and 
Neso, 2002). In addition to the level of bureaucracy involved in establishing a business in a 
country, the level of corruption or lack of good governance is also a deterrent to FDI, because, 
for a firm, paying bribes is like paying a tax and, wherever it exists, it creates uncertainty 
(Wei, 2000). Corruption can be both the cause and consequence of high administrative 
barriers in many developing countries (Morisset and Neso, 2002). 
Asiedu (2003, 2006) found that an efficient legal framework promotes FDI to Africa, while 
corruption deters investment flows to the region. Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006) argue that 
the lack of good legal and judiciary systems is a possible deterrent to FDI in Africa. The 
 14/20  
institution of the judiciary is critical to protecting property rights and improving property 
rights, in turn, was found to raise the attractiveness of South Africa as a location of FDI 
(Fedderke and Romm, 2006). In many non-francophone African countries, Te Velde (2001) 
found that freehold ownership is prohibited or requires explicit approval, which may involve 
long delays varying considerably across countries: up to two years in Mozambique, no 
freehold ownership in Namibia, up to three years in Tanzania, up to eight years in Kenya and 
up to six months in Uganda. Emery et al. (2000) concentrate on Africa, showing that 
administrative procedures and rules on ownership can form a significant barrier to FDI. Te 
Velde (2001) found that it takes one to two years to establish a business and become 
operational in Uganda and Ghana, 18 months to three years in Tanzania and Mozambique, six 
months to one year in Namibia, but only six months in Malaysia. In general, from the 1980s 
to 1990s the rate of improvements on institutional quality was lower for SSA countries as 
compared with other developing countries (Asiedu, 2004). 
FDI regulations that have liberalized restrictions have significantly contributed to the 
improvement of the investment climate (UNCTAD, 1998). They provide for non-
discrimination between foreign and domestic private investors, allow profit repatriation, 
protect against expropriation, grant incentives, strengthen the standards of treatment of 
foreign investors, and shift away from targeting specific sectors or foreign investors 
(UNCTAD, 1998).  
Bende-Nabende (2002) found that FDI liberalization is among the most dominant long-run 
determinants of FDI in SSA. The results from Asiedu (2003) also indicate that a good 
investment framework promotes FDI to Africa, i.e. investment restrictions deter investment 
flows to Africa (Asiedu, 2003). According to Basu and Srinivasan (2002), excessive market 
regulations, i.e. domestic investment policies on profit repatriation and on entry into some 
sectors of the economy were not conducive to the attraction of FDI in Africa. Ghana, for 
example, has expanded the scope for foreign investment by reducing the sectors previously 
closed to foreign investment (Basu and Srinivasan, 2002). In general, from the 1980s to the 
1990s, the pace of liberalization for SSA countries as measured by three types of indexes 
(capital controls; restrictions on trade and investment; FDI policy), was slow compared with 
other developing countries (Asiedu, 2004). 
In spite of the liberalization of FDI policies, many argue that national FDI policies may not be 
enforceable and do not address what foreign investors seek in guaranteeing security and 
benefits (Lemy and Asefa, 2003). Thus, countries are signatories to bilateral and multilateral 
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investment and trade treaties to show their commitment and to ensure the protection of 
investment and avoid double-taxation, which will lastly make them more attractive for foreign 
investors (UNCTAD, 1998).  
Lemi and Asefa (2003) found that government policy commitment as measured by the 
number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) signed by a host country and membership in 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) play an important role in attracting US 
manufacturing firms to Africa. According to Morisset (2000), the adoption of international 
agreements related to FDI explains the recent improvements in the business climate of Mali 
and Mozambique. During the 1990s both countries have become members of MIGA. Mali 
have also acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, while Mozambique have signed the International Convention on Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and National of Other States (ICSID) and become 
member of the Industrial Free Zone in 1994 and the World Intellectual Property Organization 
in 1996.  
Examples of other important instruments available for African government’s commitment are 
the agreements in the WTO relating to FDI, such as the Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) or Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreements, the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Bilateral Treaties for the 
avoidance of Double Taxation (DTTs). 
Governments can promote FDI by establishing Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) that 
specifically concentrate on marketing activities and joining the World Association of 
Investment Promotion Agencies (WIPA) that offers training and capacity building 
opportunities to IPAs (Morisset, 2003). FDI promotion addresses a market failure related to 
imperfect information on investors’ as well as on the host government’s side and thus 
emphasizes countries attractiveness for foreign investors (Wells and Wint, 1990).  
Morisset (2003) shows that greater investment promotion is associated with higher cross-
country FDI inflows. However, the author argues that investment promotion is more effective 
in a country with a good investment climate and a relatively high level of development. On 
the same vein, Dupasquier e Osakwe (2006) state that African governments set up agencies to 
promote foreign investment without taking steps to lift the constraints on FDI in the region 
and therefore IPAs have not been successful in reversing the declining trend in FDI flows to 
the region. 
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The profitability of investment, the productivity of capital is another major determinant of 
FDI flows. FDI will go to countries that pay a higher return on capital, i.e. the international 
movement of FDI occurs when rates of return on FDI exceed the rates of return on home 
investment (Root, 1984). 
Jaspersen et al. (2000) and Asiedu (2002a) use the inverse of real GDP per capita as a proxy 
for the rate of return on investment (as capital-scarce countries generally have a higher rate of 
return, implying low per capita income) and found a negative relationship between the two 
variables for the Africa region and for non-SSA countries, respectively. Moreover, Schoeman 
et al. (2000) use the yield-interest differential in order to capture the return on investment in 
South Africa (for investment to be profitable, the yield on investment should exceed its 
opportunity cost, the real interest rate) and found that an increase in the difference between 
the yield (return) on investment and the interest rate increases FDI flows in South Africa. 
Alongside the host country’s real wage rates, foreign exchange rates, land and property 
rents/rates, fuel costs, local input costs (where applicable), level of taxation, transportation 
costs, and cost of capital are other key cost-related locational factors that may considerably 
influence the choice of an investment location (Bende-Nabende, 2002). Schoeman et al. 
(2000) and Fedderke and Room (2006) find that corporate tax rates impact negatively on FDI 
to South Africa. Bende-Nabende (2002) and Yasin (2005) show that low currency values are 
expected to encourage FDI flows in Africa. Lemi and Asefa (2003) use the cost of capital (i.e. 
lending interest rate) as a control variable for examining the relationship between uncertainty 
and FDI flows in African economies, but the estimated coefficient rendered non-significant.  
Foreign investors can be lured to countries with an existing concentration of other foreign 
investors, since it is a good signal of favourable conditions and there are evident economies of 
scale in the development of backward and forward linkages (UNCTAD, 1998; Kinoshota, 
2003). However, the agglomeration of economies or the clustering of investors as partially 
captured by the share of urban population does not appear to have been a major determinant 
in the business climate for FDI in Africa (Morisset, 2000).  
Host governments offer incentives in the form of fiscal and financial attractions to positively 
influence FDI inflows, by reducing costs and making investment more profitable (Krugell, 
2005). However, the empirical evidence shows that incentives influence investment decisions 
only at the margin, i.e. in places where other aspects of the business climate are already 
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favourable (e.g. Bergsman, 1999). In short, incentives play a role once fundamentals are 
sufficient (Te Velde, 2001). 
FDI policies are usually accompanied by other policies aimed at influencing locational 
decisions, such as privatization policies; if privatization programmes welcome foreign 
investors, then it broadens the scope of FDI (UNCTAD, 1998). Indeed, launching an 
attractive privatization programme is among the strategic actions recommended by Morisset 
(2000) for the improvement of the investment climate for FDI, based on a detailed review of 
the policy reforms implemented by two of the most attractive countries during the 1990s: 
Mali and Mozambique. However, a survey of investors by Martin and Rose-Innes (2003) did 
not bring out privatization as one of the factors for the large capital inflows to Africa, except 
for a few investors who had bought privatized companies. 
As stated in the previous section, the study by Yasin (2005) examines how ODA influences 
FDI in Africa, based on the assumption that ODA programs may remove some of the 
obstacles to FDI flows and thus improve the economic conditions that attract FDI. The results 
for Africa indicate that a positive relationship exists between bilateral ODA and FDI, while 
multilateral ODA is not a critical requirement for FDI activities by the multinationals located 
in these countries.  
4. Conclusion 
Many possible concluding comments and remarks can be drawn from this survey. At least, 
two important remarks should be made. First, the common perception among many observers 
is that FDI in African countries is largely driven by their natural resources or aimed at the 
local market. As stated in the previous section, these are not the only determinants of FDI to 
the region. Even though the African countries that have been able to attract most FDI have 
been those with natural and mineral resources as well as (relative) large domestic markets, 
many other factors influence investment decisions in Africa. Second, several of the factors 
discussed above are indeed impediments or obstacles of FDI to Africa and thus reasons why 
Africa, in general, has not been successful in attracting FDI. However, awareness of these 
constraints enables government agencies and the like to device concrete strategies to reverse 
Africa’s poor FDI record.  
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